Fertility decisions in transition : young adults' perceptions on fertility three decades apart in Spain by Bueno, Xiana
“This is an original manuscript / preprint of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Bueno, X. (2019): 
Fertility Decisions in Transition: Young Adults’ Perceptions on Fertility Three Decades Apart in Spain. 
The History of the Family. (Online first on 8 novembre 2019), available online: 
https://doi.org/10.1080/1081602X.2019.1686049.” 
 
 
1 
 
Fertility Decisions in Transition: Young Adults’ Views on Fertility Three 
Decades Apart in Spain 
Xiana Bueno 
Centre d’Estudis Demogràfics, Barcelona, Spain 
 
The aim of this study is to analyze the generational change in the reasoning regarding 
fertility decisions between young Spanish adults in the mid-1980s and young Spanish 
adults in the early 2010s and to test the extent to which the theoretical perspectives on 
fertility are represented in the reasoning of individuals. For almost thirty years, Spain has 
had low fertility levels that contrast with the persistent ideal family size of two children. 
However, the literature has barely explored individuals’ reasoning for fertility decision-
making over time. This paper seizes the unique opportunity to analyze 97 in-depth personal 
interviews of highly educated young adults in urban Spain from two independent studies 
conducted in 1985 and 2012. The results indicate that although the value change associated 
with the second demographic transition remains over time, the changes in age norms and 
partnership formation norms underlie the main differences between the two generations. 
Economic uncertainty and the lack of support for work-life balance stand out as persistent 
structural factors that influence the fertility decisions in both samples. In addition, the 
respondents’ narratives confirm that the transition of gender-role norms towards greater 
egalitarianism remains unfinished. By placing value on the reasoning of individuals, this 
study contributes to understanding how the macrolevel theoretical framework that explains 
fertility evolved over time and adapts to the microlevel of analysis. 
Keywords: fertility, Spain, comparative analysis, qualitative analysis, generational change, 
Second Demographic Transition, gender egalitarianism, economic uncertainty. 
Introduction 
During the last four decades, low fertility has become a common characteristic for many 
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postindustrial societies. From previous research, we know that Western countries have gradually 
experienced important normative and cultural changes around family formation, especially 
regarding the postponement of marriage and childbearing. This set of value changes are known 
as the Second Demographic Transition (SDT) (Lesthaeghe & Van de Kaa, 1986; Van de Kaa 
1987). Such changes are not independent from social and economic changes. Economic theories 
suggest that the incorporation of women into the labor market and the opportunity cost of having 
a child because of it is a reason for the postponing and lowering of fertility behavior. In addition, 
the role of macro-economic conditions regarding labor-market stability and the lack of 
institutional support for dual-earner couples cannot be neglected as influencing factors in 
generating perceived economic (in)security for making fertility decisions (Comolli, 2017; 
Kreyenfeld et al., 2012). Finally, and closely linked to the two mentioned factors, research has 
emphasized the increasing importance of gender egalitarianism in explaining low fertility, both 
at the individual level—gender-role attitudes and behaviors—and at the institutional level—labor 
market institutions and family policies (Esping-Andersen & Billari, 2015; Goldscheider et al., 
2015; McDonald, 2000a, 2000b).  
These three factors—the value changes associated with the SDT, economic uncertainty, 
and gender-role conflicts—are closely connected to one another. However, it remains unclear 
how these macro-level perspectives can or cannot be accommodated at the micro level in 
individuals’ narratives. Despite the abundant scientific literature on this topic, the evolution of 
individuals’ reasoning regarding fertility decisions has not been compared over time, particularly 
from the time of emerging new family behaviors, i.e., the 1970s and 1980s, until today (the 
2010s). How has young adults’ reasoning about fertility evolved across generations? To what 
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extent can the theoretical arguments be identified in individuals’ reasoning? Using qualitative 
data, this study contributes to fill in this gap by exploring whether a generational change occurs 
in the reasoning for fertility decisions between young Spanish adults in the mid-1980s and young 
adults in the early 2010s. It leverages the alluring opportunity to compare the narratives from 
nearly 100 in-depth personal interviews of respondents from two generations approximately 
thirty years apart. The present qualitative study illustrates individuals’ reasoning and 
mechanisms for fertility decision-making, which cannot be revealed by using survey data. Re-
visiting the interview materials from the 1980s thirty years later allows them to be compared 
with contemporary interview data from a new perspective. The subsequent implication of this 
research is a contribution to theory validation at the micro level from the less frequent 
perspective of individual reasoning. 
The samples purposely comprise highly educated individuals for three reasons. First, 
there is a positive relationship between higher education and the fulfillment of fertility 
aspirations (Toulemon & Testa, 2005). Second, there is a closer link between higher education 
and gender egalitarianism (Goldscheider et al., 2015). Third, it has been suggested that highly 
educated individuals are the forerunners of fertility change (Sobotka, 2008). 
Spain is a suitable context in which to explore these questions, since it became a low-
fertility country more than three decades ago (Billari & Kohler, 2004). However, in Spain and in 
other low-fertility settings, the two-child norm as the ideal family size for couples persists 
(Sobotka & Beaujouan, 2014). This mismatch between fertility levels and couples’ ideal fertility 
is occurring in a context in which gender egalitarian ideology has increased substantially over 
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time (Arpino et al., 2015) and in which the levels of economic uncertainty have remained high 
over time (Adserà, 2011a, 2011b; De La Rica & Iza, 2005). 
Background 
Second Demographic Transition 
Lesthaeghe and Van de Kaa (1986) and Van de Kaa (1987) identified the SDT with a set of value 
changes related to family formation. These changes included the increase and social acceptance 
of divorce, non-marital cohabitation, births out of wedlock, new family models, a progressive 
secularization process, an increase in individualistic values and a greater importance of self-
fulfillment. Some technological and legal changes related to contraceptive measures, assisted 
reproduction, and abortion contributed to this value change. In addition, the SDT cannot be 
understood far from the structural change imposed by the educational expansion and the 
incorporation of women in the labor market. Thus, the SDT is used to understand the 
postponement of family formation and the subsequent patterns of low fertility in European 
societies. This process of the destandardization of the life course (Lesthaeghe & Moors, 
2000:153) was originated as a Northern and Western European phenomenon during the 1960s 
that did not arrive in Spain and other Southern European countries until at least two decades later 
(Surkyn & Lesthaeghe, 2004). Although most of these value and behavioral changes have 
arrived to stay (Lesthaeghe & Surkyn, 2008; Sobotka et al., 2003), the dynamic nature of a 
‘transition’ is meant to be ephemeral. Thus, by examining the reasoning of two generations on 
fertility, this study hypothesizes that the presence of the SDT’s associated values in the fertility 
reasoning of the younger generation will be weaker than in the older generation given that the 
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societal normative framework for having children will no longer be the same. 
Since the 1960s, the SDT has become a key concept for European demographers; 
however, despite its general good reception, time has uncovered some competing reactions. 
Some scholars have pointed out that the SDT is ambiguous and not strictly ‘demographic’ 
(Coleman, 2004) and that as a ‘transition,’ the starting and endpoints have never been defined 
(Bernhardt, 2004; Cliquet, 1991). Its main criticism may be that the concept itself implies a 
convergence of behaviors across countries that has not been observed (Sobotka, 2008). Several 
studies have aimed to test the SDT in country contexts different from Nordic countries. When 
finding empirical evidence of the value change associated with the SDT, authors have also 
acknowledged the different pace and process of transition in different European regions (Hoem 
et al., 2009; Kertzer et al., 2009; Sobotka et al., 2003; Surkyn & Lesthaegue, 2004). However, in 
non-EU western countries such as East and Southeast Asia (Atoh et al., 2004), Russia (Perelli-
Harris & Gerber, 2011), or the U.S. (Raley, 2001), scholars have found partial or no evidence of 
the SDT. 
Economic Uncertainty  
One of the conclusions of Surkyn and Lesthaegue (2004) in their work about the spread of the 
SDT through Europe is that the value and behavioral changes related to family formation are 
necessary but not sufficient to explain the demographic changes. The economic and political 
changes are also influencing factors and have not been under the original scope of the SDT 
(Bernhardt, 2004; Liefbroer & Fokkema, 2008). The study of the relationship between economic 
uncertainty and fertility has a long tradition in explaining the postponement of children (Sobotka 
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et al., 2003). Many studies have found that unemployment, especially male unemployment, has a 
postponement effect on fertility decisions (Cazzola et al., 2016; Kravdal, 2002; Pailhé & Solaz, 
2012; Schmitt, 2012; Vignoli et al., 2012). Evidence for fertility postponement has also been 
found among highly-educated women experiencing economic uncertainty (Kreyenfeld, 2010). 
Moreover, in contexts with a weak welfare state, such as the Spanish context (Esping-Andersen, 
1999), economic uncertainty goes hand-in-hand with the lack of state support for childbearing, 
for example, the availability of public daycare, family policies, the work-life balance, and labor-
market flexibility (Domínguez-Folgueras, 2018; Lapuerta et al., 2011), which lowers young 
adults’ fertility intentions (Brinton et al., 2018; Bueno & Brinton, 2019).  
Although financial and economic conditions have traditionally affected family dynamics, 
the interest in this relationship in the literature was renewed with the onset of the Great 
Recession in 2008 (Comolli, 2017; Kreyenfeld et al., 2012; Sobotka et al., 2011). For this 
analysis, it is acknowledged that the interviewees from both generations were experiencing times 
of economic uncertainty because of the 1970s’ oil crisis and 2008’s Great Recession. It is, 
therefore, hypothesized that the narratives from both sets of interviewees refer to economic 
uncertainty as a reason for limiting or postponing their fertility intentions.  
An unstable economy and weaker welfare states often coexist with lower levels of gender 
equity both in labor-market institutions and family policies (Kreyenfeld et al., 2012); 
accordingly, these two factors—economic uncertainty and gender equity—are highly 
interrelated.  
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Gender Egalitarianism 
The gender dimension is not only closely linked to economic uncertainty. The changes 
associated with the SDT are also changes closely linked to a shift in gender-role norms, attitudes, 
and behaviors. However, some authors have identified the lack of a gender perspective as one of 
the shortcomings of the SDT perspective (Bernhardt, 2004; Kertzer et al., 2009). The shift in 
gender roles recently paved the way for a new theoretical approach that places gender equity at 
the center of the fertility debate and posits that it is the keystone of a couple’s fulfillment of their 
fertility aspirations (Esping-Andersen & Billari, 2015; Goldscheider et al., 2015; McDonald, 
2000a, 2000b). According to this theoretical approach, the end of the prevalence of the male-
breadwinner-female-caregiver model led to the onset of a new, and not yet resolved, gender-role 
conflict, which is based on the inability of social institutions and individual behaviors to adapt to 
the new dual-earner model for families. At the societal level, in McDonald’s (2000b) terms, there 
is an incoherence between the high level of gender equity in social institutions addressed to 
individuals (i.e., access to education and the labor market) and the low gender equity level in the 
social institutions that address families, such as labor market characteristics (i.e., work hour 
flexibility, the gender wage gap) and the State intervention that supports families (i.e., the tax 
system, parental and childcare leave policies). At the individual level, the mismatch occurs 
between the public and private spheres. Although women have been widely incorporated into the 
labor market, men do not equally share in housework and childcare tasks. This fact causes a 
downward trend in fertility since women still play a double role in the work-family conflict. In 
this regard, Bernhardt (2004) points out that the SDT framework should incorporate the gender 
inequality dimensions since the opportunity cost of having children and the value change 
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regarding the family are not the same for women and men. In this analysis, it is hypothesized that 
the respondents from the older generation (interviewed in 1985) will express fewer constraints 
on fertility decisions related to gender inequality and the work-life balance conflict than the 
respondents from the younger generation (interviewed in 2012) will express. The secondary role 
in the labor market for women from the eighties compared with the larger presence of dual-
earner couples in the younger cohort would explain such a difference. 
The three theoretical perspectives have points of connection that represent the evolution 
of the theoretical thinking in relation to fertility. This connection represents a transition itself. 
Therefore, the approach of this study is to examine the extent to which this shift in the theories 
that explain low fertility is also observed in the reasoning and motivations that surround fertility 
decisions over time as reported by young adults in Spain. Are the characteristics associated with 
the SDT present in the individual’s narratives as reasons, obstacles, or concerns regarding their 
fertility decisions? If so, do they persist over time between two generations that are thirty years 
apart?  
The Spanish Context  
Spain became a low-fertility country in the mid-eighties (Figure 1). The Total Fertility Rates 
(TFR) were 1.64 in 1985 and crossed the barrier of 1.5 children per woman in 1987. In 2012, the 
TFR decreased to 1.32 children per woman (1.27 for native-born women). Simultaneously, the 
mean age at first child had uninterruptedly increased during the period and was six years apart 
between the time of our interviews in 1985, when it was 25.8 years old, and 2012, when it was 
30.9 years old. Therefore, Spain has been identified for having the lowest-low-fertility levels and 
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the latest-late mean age at first child (Billari & Kohler, 2004). 
-- Figure 1 approximately here -- 
The continuous postponement of the first child and the fall in the birth rates of the second and 
third orders are the two main demographic explanations of the transition of Spain to a low-
fertility country (Alberdi, 1995; Bernardi & Requena, 2003; Delgado & Livi-Bacci, 1992; 
Ortega-Osona & Kohler, 2001). Over the years, it has been shown that the increases in non-
marital cohabitation and divorce rates have not decreased the fertility levels as they were 
expected to in the past (Billari & Kohler, 2004). Moreover, this postponement of fertility must be 
understood around a number of social and economic changes. The transition to democracy in 
Spain after Franco’s death in 1975 brought radical transformations that led Spain towards the 
modernization of the economy and society. Important changes in family-related policies were 
achieved: the use of contraceptives was approved in 1978; the divorce law was instituted in 
1981; and abortion was legalized in 1985. By then, the most traditional national-Catholic 
discourse regarding partnership formation and childbearing lost part of its legitimacy, and young 
adults were more open to break social norms and adopt new behaviors. Thus, in light of the 
changes that occurred in family formation patterns, the SDT perspective was an appropriate 
framework to explain the fertility decline after 1975 (Alberdi, 1995; Bernardi & Requena, 2003; 
Devolder & Cabré, 2009). 
Since this time, high unemployment has also characterized Spain and is a feature that has 
become structural of the Spanish labor market over time. The unemployment rates for 
individuals aged 25-34 years old in 1985 and 2012 were 21.6% and 27.6%, respectively 
(according to OECD data). Because of high levels of economic uncertainty, young adults’ 
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transition to adulthood in Spain has been identified as one of the latest in the world, which results 
in delays in leaving the parental home, economic independence, partnership formation, and the 
arrival of the first child (Alberdi, 1995; Baizán et al., 2003). This chain of delays in life-course 
events is one of the leading explanations for the high levels of childlessness among Spanish 
women. Recent studies forecast that one in four women born in 1975 will reach the age of fifty 
without having had a child (Esteve et al., 2016). 
The transition to democracy has also brought changes in gender roles because of 
women’s educational expansion and greater labor force participation. However, although Spain’s 
gender-role attitudes have rapidly evolved into higher levels of egalitarianism (Arpino et al., 
2015), the pace of change is slower with respect to behaviors (Abril et al., 2015), which results in 
a non-resolved gender-role conflict. 
Data and Methods 
Two Qualitative Studies 
This analysis is based on two independent qualitative studies on family formation conducted in 
1985 and 2012. Both studies were conducted in the metropolitan areas of Madrid and Barcelona, 
with men and women of similar ages and in different stages of the family formation process. In 
both studies, the interviewees provided details regarding their economic and job characteristics, 
partnership formation, fertility intentions, housework and childcare division of labor, and gender-
role attitudes. In addition, a questionnaire that collected the sociodemographic characteristics of 
both partners was completed in both cases.  
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Sample Characteristics 
Both samples comprise men and women in stable unions who hold a post-secondary education 
degree1. The total sample in the 1985 study comprised 144 interviews from which a subsample 
of highly educated respondents was selected for this analysis. The total sample in the 2012 study 
comprised more than 400 interviews in five different countries from which a subsample of 
partnered respondents in Spain was selected for this analysis. By focusing only on highly 
educated individuals, the social class heterogeneity of the qualitative comparative analysis is also 
minimized. The sample from 1985 (cohorts born between 1944 and 1964) consists of 44 
respondents, whereas the sample from 2012 (cohorts born between 1976 and 1987) consists of 
53 respondents. Table 1 summarizes the basic sociodemographic characteristics of both samples. 
The interviewees from 2012 are equally distributed by gender. In 1985, there were twice as many 
males as females given that higher education among women was less common. The age range 
covers 20-40-year-olds for the 1985 data and 24-35-year-olds for the 2012 data; the mean ages 
are similar at 29.3 and 30.3 years, respectively. The 1980s study allowed for respondents who 
had two children; therefore, a quarter of its sample are parents of two children, whereas the 2012 
study was designed for respondents who had one or no children. 
--- Table 1 approximately here --- 
                                                          
1 The total sample in the 1985 study was comprised of 144 interviews, from which a subsample of highly 
educated respondents was selected for this analysis. The total sample in the 2012 study was 
comprised of more than 400 interviews in five different countries, from which a subsample of 
partnered respondents in Spain was selected for this analysis 
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Data Collection 
In both cases, the recruitment was conducted by using the snowball sampling method, which 
started with a large number of individuals as “seeds” who were subsequently questioned for up 
to two referrals. The interviews were conducted face-to-face in Spanish or Catalan and lasted 
from 60 to 120 minutes. All interviews were voice-recorded and were subsequently transcribed 
in full by a native speaker. In 1985, the majority of the interviews were conducted by a male 
interviewer for the male respondents and by a female interviewer for the female respondents. In 
2012, one female interviewer, the author, collected all of the interviews. One of the strengths of 
both studies is the shared status of the interviewees and interviewers (who were also highly 
educated, native-born Spanish within the same age range as the respondents), which enhanced 
the mutual trust and made it easy to establish rapport. These commonalities may have facilitated 
greater sharing on the part of the participants (Bhopal, 2010).  
Data Analysis 
In a first coding stage, descriptive codes were established by topic. Thematic coding for the 2012 
study was performed by using the qualitative software Dedoose. The 1985 study’s materials were 
already coded by topic. In a second stage, I inductively coded and wrote extensive detailed 
memos regarding the respondents’ reasoning related to fertility decisions for both samples. I 
have drawn primarily on fertility intentions and the conditions and obstacles considered in the 
decision-making process. These questions were asked retrospectively for the respondents who 
were already parents. Other respondents’ characteristics were also considered such as the 
respondents’ and their partners’ sociodemographic and labor characteristics and their household 
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division of labor. 
Before presenting the findings, several limitations of the analysis need to be 
acknowledged. First, the 1985 sample was purposely designed to over-represent cohabiters. 
Thirty-five percent of the 1985 sample are cohabiting couples—all childless except one—while 
in 2012, the percentage of the respondents in cohabiting couples reaches 70%, forty percent of 
which are already parents. Second, given the timing of the educational expansion in Spain, 
namely, the 1980s-1990s, the highly-educated respondents—particularly the women—from 1985 
represent a more selective sample than in 2012. This implies that the respondents from the 1985 
sample might belong to a higher position in the socioeconomic scale compared with the 2012 
sample. Finally, the views of men and women on the gender equity level within the couple may 
differ depending on which partner is asked. In general, men tend to overestimate their 
contribution at home (Kamo, 2000; Press & Townsley, 1998). This suggests that our male 
respondents may underestimate the gender-role conflict in their relationships as an obstacle to or 
condition of having children. 
Findings 
The results compare the respondents’ narratives about fertility decisions under the prism of the 
three theoretical perspectives. Table 2 provides a summary of the obtained results. I first grouped 
the interviewees’ narratives that differ from one another in the two studies and that illustrate the 
changes posited by the SDT to suggest how some reasoning that was transitioning during the 
1980s achieved the status of transitioned by disappearing in the 2010s. I then presented the 
reasoning that shows how the economic uncertainty and lack of work flexibility remained largely 
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unchanged over the thirty years between the two studies. Finally, I emphasize how the gender 
equity conflict remains in transition, since after having been initiated in the 1980s, it continues to 
be unfinished in the 2010s.  
--- Table 2 approximately here --- 
Transitioners and Transitioned  
By comparing the narratives from both generations, two important normative changes are 
observed in relation to the age norms and partnership formation norms. 
As previously discussed, the delay in life-cycle transitions (i.e., adulthood, partnership 
formation, and childbearing) has also generated a shift in the age norms related to what is 
considered to be the appropriate age to have children. Some respondents from the 1985 study 
manifested an explicit interest in enjoying their period of being childfree to focus on personal 
projects or career development or to simply enjoy their lives as a childless couple. These 
respondents represent the values of individualism and argue for their right to choose their life 
decisions, which is one feature that characterizes the SDT. Guillermo, for example, was 24 years 
old in 1985. He and his partner were not planning to have a child until their 30s. 
What conditions do you need in order to have a child? 
Mainly… comfort. Having a child would limit us too much, our relationship but also many 
other aspects of our life, at work, socializing with others. We don’t have a deadline, maybe 
in five years, but first, we want to live some years without children. Also, because we don’t 
want to live for a very long time in the same place or work at the same company… and in 
this sense, a child cramps your style. 
The respondents in the 2012 sample also reported the idea of “enjoying childlessness” before 
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having kids; however, the meaning and age reference are different for them. For many 
respondents, having enjoyed childlessness is a reason for deciding to have a child rather than a 
reason to postpone parenthood as indicated in the 1985 sample. Cristian was 33 years old, and 
his partner was 31. They had a one-year-old daughter in 2012.  
… [I don’t miss] going to parties, going out at night, and these types of things… We used to 
do it, but we were already tired of it [by the time we had our daughter] to be honest. We have 
already spent many years doing it, and we got tired of it. 
Guillermo and Cristian’s ages are nine years apart—24 and 33 years old, respectively—but 
although Guillermo’s narrative reflects the necessity of justifying his fertility postponement 
during his 20s, Cristian’s narrative suggest that he and his partner simply were ready to have a 
child in their early 30s because they had already enjoyed their childlessness during their 20s. 
This means that the SDT postmaterialist values remain over time, but due to the shift in age 
norms, Cristian’s generation did not feel the same social pressure to have children in their 20s as 
Guillermo’s generation felt. 
A second example that illustrates the shift in age norms is social and family pressure. 
Some interviewees in 1985 express how their parenthood decisions are influenced by the 
pressure that they feel to have children at a certain age. This is the case of Maria Jesús, a 25-
year-old married childless respondent in 1985. 
I think [I will have] one [child] and let’s see. I don’t really like them [children], this is true… 
I will have it because… it seems that at a certain age, you should have a kid, or or I don’t 
know why…. But at a certain time, there is this need…. 
Although the entire sample from 2012 reported their intention to have children someday, they 
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felt relaxed in terms of social or family pressure. Although they declare that their parents may 
feel sad if they end up not having children, they also state that their decision would be fully 
respected by their family. For them, the concept of pressure as originating from family or society 
does not appear in their narratives. In contrast, pressure appears to be related to the feeling of 
“running out of time” when for some respondents, mostly women but also men, the biological 
clock starts to tick.  
The shift in age norms for family formation illustrates the different narratives across the 
two generations. Some respondents from the older generation initiated fertility postponement for 
individualistic reasons while feeling family and social pressures for not having children. The 
newer generation adopted the new age norms after having had sufficient time to enjoy 
childlessness, and their pressure originates from biological age rather than from family or 
society. 
The second set of reasons expressed by the respondents in 1985 that was missing in the 
2012 interviewees’ narratives address changes linked to partnership formation. An initial 
difference is the progressive loss of the legitimation of the institution of marriage. The number of 
marriages in Spain has continuously decreased since the 1980s. This process was accompanied 
by a secularization process. In 1996, 76.7% of marriages were Catholic compared with 37.4% in 
2012. The norm for the respondents in 1985 was that marriage should precede the birth of the 
first child as a necessary condition, even for cohabiting couples. This is the case of Esther, a 23-
year-old childless woman who cohabited with her partner, a 27-year-old. Her words also reflect 
the younger age norms for parenthood in the eighties. 
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We have concluded that if we are going to get married, it will be by the time we want to have 
a kid. We know for sure that we want to have children, but I still see myself as very young. I 
tell him ‘let’s wait until I am 25 or so’, and he respects it… … then, yes, we will get married 
because of the child and because I will make my parents happy.  
Non-marital cohabitation is now well-accepted in Spanish society. Nearly 40% of the babies in 
Spain in 2012 were born from non-married mothers, whereas this figure was only 4% in 1980 
(Castro-Martín & Seiz-Puyuelo, 2014). With almost no exceptions, the respondents in 2012 did 
not consider marriage a condition for having children. Many of the respondents who were 
already parents were not married or got married after having a baby. For many individuals, 
marriage means an administrative procedure that provides several practical advantages, such as 
benefits from employers or better conditions for paying taxes.  
The second difference in partnership formation and childbearing that emerges in the 
comparison of the two samples is the presence of numerous shotgun marriages in 1985, that is, 
hurried marriages that followed an unexpected pregnancy. The normalization of the use of 
contraceptives and the legitimation of abortion have contributed to individuals’ right to choose 
the timing of their parenthood. There were also several cases of unexpected pregnancies in 2012; 
however, in the majority of them, the partners were in their early thirties and in a stable 
relationship. Thus, the implications of an unexpected pregnancy for the two cohorts were 
diametrically different. Some respondents in 1985 explained their experience as regretting to 
have had to give up many things to start a family. Felix is one example. He and his partner were 
24 years old in 1985, and she got pregnant when they were 18. His statement also reflects the 
individualism values described in the previous section. 
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Not at the moment. No because she wants to continue studying in the university, she just has 
started so a child would interrupt [her studies]. I am very happy with my kid, but we also 
have to live our own life. And having another kid means, at least for another four years, to be 
very focused on the child without being able to live, socialize with others.  
This comparison suggests that many of the obstacles and conditions experienced by the 1985 
respondents that support the SDT rationale became less significant among the 2012 respondents. 
The changes in the age and partnership formation norms are the reasons behind this 
intergenerational change. The 1985 respondents largely represented the SDT—the 
transitioners—whereas I argue that the 2012 respondents overcame these changes. It does not 
mean, however, that postmaterialist values are no longer important for the younger generation, 
but they are less relevant in explaining the fertility behavior due to the changes in societal norms. 
Economic Uncertainty Remains Unchanged 
Despite the passage of three decades, the narratives from both samples shared some reasoning 
related to fertility. Both studies were conducted in times of economic crisis and a lack of policies 
that facilitate the work-life balance, which were both reflected in the interviewees’ reasoning. 
First, achieving a certain economic stability stood out as the most common obstacle for 
fertility alluded to by the respondents from both generations. Having a child is perceived as 
costly and in some cases, a “luxury.” Moreover, although the interviewees had relatively high 
human capital (at least a post-secondary education), the subjective perception of economic 
insecurity among them was also present in many of their narratives, even when both partners 
were employed. Perceived economic insecurity affects not only the timing of childbearing but 
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also the number of intended children. In the 1985 sample, Felipe represents this reasoning. He 
was a married 37-year-old father of one child. 
Yes, we want to have a second child, but so far, the decision depends mainly on the job 
situation we have gone through, which has influenced us in not having another kid yet, 
because [having another kid] would have brought economic problems to the family, so it 
stopped us.  
Unemployment in the eighties sample affected 8 out of the 43 couples, and in 2012, it affected 
18 out of the 53 couples. Men were more affected in 1985, whereas women were more affected 
in 2012. Moreover, in 2012, there were more couples in which the female partner out-earns the 
male partner or is the sole provider. Ruth and her partner, who are childless, are one of these 
couples. They were 26 and 28 years old, respectively, in 2012 and wanted to become parents. 
Right now? My partner’s job [is stopping us from having a child]. His salary is too low. I 
have a contract for four years, and [the salary] is more than what I used to earn before, but it 
is still peanuts. If he could have a more or less average salary, then maybe… [we would go 
for it]. But he now has a temporary contract, which implies a certain instability… yeah… 
now is not a good time. 
Second, regardless of the time point, the insufficient intervention of the State in supporting 
families is a shared perception among our interviewees. Young couples need to make 
arrangements in their daily life to be able to combine work and family, which becomes 
particularly difficult during the first three years of the child’s life. In the eighties, the respondents 
who had more conservative values opted for a male-breadwinner, female-caregiver model, 
whereas the couples who did not assume these roles postponed their parenthood or dealt with the 
work-family conflict. In 1985, Menchu was a 24-year-old, married and childless respondent. She 
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envisioned children only when at least one of them had a certain flexibility in their working 
hours. 
Yes, but in a few years... My plan is, well, besides finishing my studies and having our own 
apartment, I would like that at least one of us have a flexible schedule to take care of the 
child… …because what I don’t see logical is that… ok, after the three months of maternity 
leave, you then have to put your child in daycare at 6 am. It’s inhuman! But, well, it’s what 
most people have to do, right? And maybe it’s going to be the same for us... because if you 
start working at 8 am and you live in the suburbs, you have to leave home two hours earlier. 
Thirty years later, this type of reasoning remains present in young adults’ voices. During the 
previous three decades, improvements in parental leave and public childcare availability were 
limited. Paternity leave consists of 8 weeks since 2019, whereas it was only two days in 1985 
and two weeks in 2012. Maternity leave of 16 weeks has remained stable since 1980. The 
Spanish parental leave system increases gender inequality by preserving the gender differences 
associated with gender-role specialization (Lapuerta et al., 2011). After paid allowances for 
parents, the childcare leave system is generous in its length; however, it does not offer wage 
replacement. The respondents from the 2012 sample expressed the difficulty of taking unpaid 
childcare leaves and living with only one salary. Paradoxically, the limited availability of public 
daycares and the high cost of private daycares lead individuals to think in terms similar to 
Alberto. In 2012, he was 30 years old and his partner was 29. They were parents of a seven-
month-old baby.  
…what they [the government] should do is to allow people to have a child in an easier way. I 
think that reducing working hours is very important so that the couple can find balanced 
childcare. But what has to happen above all is the development of public [measures], like 
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public daycare, because there aren’t any, and it is so difficult to find a [daycare] vacancy. 
Look, we have two jobs, but our income is low, and it is not enough to pay 400€ [per 
month], the cost right now for a private daycare, at least here in Madrid, but we don’t qualify 
for aid, and we won’t get a spot in the public [daycare]. Then, I think that measures focused 
on this are necessary, and many.  
Alberto’s reasoning was similar to several couples as a situation that may occur for them or 
around them. Unlike in the 1985 sample, all couples in the 2012 sample were dual-earner 
couples, the majority of whom did not consider the possibility of one of the partners assuming 
the full-time role of caregiver. An alternative arrangement for them was to obtain the support of 
the family network, which includes grandparents in most cases. The comparison of the two 
generations suggests that despite some of the progress that has occurred in Spanish family and 
labor-market policies during the last three decades, these changes have not fulfilled young 
couples’ needs for family formation. 
Gender in Transition 
As mentioned before, the changes in gender roles, which are closely linked to the value changes 
associated with the SDT, have not been completely incorporated into individuals’ behaviors and 
public institutions. Although gender egalitarianism has substantially advanced since 1985; it can 
still be considered a process in transition. Two aspects of this unfinished gender-role transition 
stood out among the respondents as obstacles and conditions for fertility: the changes in females’ 
labor force participation and the persisting gender inequality within the household. These two 
reasons are present in the narratives of many respondents from 2012; however, they also started 
to appear in the respondents from 1985 who held a more progressive ideology and who 
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coincided with the couples who were in stable cohabiting relationships at this time (Alabart et 
al., 1988). Thus, the cohabiters from 1985 may be considered the forerunners of the value 
change. 
First, females’ greater labor force participation coupled with economic uncertainty are the 
determining factors of the postponement of childbearing and fertility decline in Spain. Two 
aspects from the eighties’ materials are of great interest in this regard. On the one hand, more 
traditional couples considered females’ labor force participation as a “hobby” or a small 
contribution, which they referred to as “help” to complement the household income (Alabart et 
al., 1988). For these respondents, female labor force participation was not a priority, and it was 
not among the reasons that explained their fertility decisions. On the other hand, there were a few 
progressive couples for whom having a(nother) child was subject to the female partner’s job 
stability. María Luisa was a 21-year-old childless interviewee who was cohabiting with her 
partner. She had a number of plans for her future, among which becoming a mother would arrive 
after fulfilling other personal goals. 
Not now, but in the distant future. I need to do many things until I can say ‘Well, this is the 
right moment to have a child’ because a child is a lot… you need certain conditions…. And, 
right now, I don’t have enough time, and I don’t consider myself mature enough… I think, at 
least not in 10 years… now I want to finish my studies, I want to study abroad…. I want to 
work and have a good job. And of course, if you have a child, you cannot focus on jobs that 
require many hours. 
However, María Luisa was part of a minority in the sample from 1985. In the comparison of both 
studies, it becomes clear that placing females’ job and career development before parenthood is a 
very common reasoning for the respondents in 2012. The labor force participation of women 25-
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54 years old increased from 35.1% in 1985 to 81.1% in 2012 (OECD Stats); however, job 
precariousness and unemployment persisted and affected more females than males, which is also 
reflected in our samples. Manuel and his partner, a childless couple aged 30 and 29 years in 
2012, represent one case.  
In our case, the most important factor is that my partner wants it [have a child]. I have told 
her that whenever she wants, whenever she feels ready and considers that it is the right 
moment. Economically, I think we can afford it now, but it will depend on when she feels 
fulfilled in other aspects. She wants to wait. 
Manuel and his partner, similar to other couples from 2012, were also very egalitarian in their 
distribution of domestic work. However, traditional gender roles were deeply rooted in 1980s 
Spain. Many women from the 1985 study had a secondary earner role, and the majority of them 
were responsible for most of the housework and childcare (Alabart et al., 1988). Some females 
from 1985 quit their jobs to become mothers. This was the case of Mariví, a 31-year-old 
biologist mother of two children in 1985. In light of the unequal distribution of unpaid work at 
home, Mariví rejected her husband’s suggestion of having a third child. 
My husband wouldn’t mind [having another child] (She laughs). He thinks three is ok. But of 
course, he doesn’t take care of them! Me? Three? No, no, no, no. Don’t even talk about it! I 
mean, it is great to dedicate my life to them, and I love them [my children], but they drive 
you crazy, they exhaust you, precisely because I am devoted to them… …Here is the thing, 
if I spend half of the day outside and then I spend a little time with them in the evening, then 
I would probably have a different view. But when it is night, I am fed up with them, and 
now, I don’t see myself with another child… forget it! 
In addition to stay-at-home women such as Mariví, other women from the 1985 sample, in 
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addition to having a job, assumed their roles as primary housekeepers and caregivers with little 
negotiation with their partners. These women carried the second shift (Hochschild, 1989). The 
respondents who reported a more equal distribution of labor at home coincided with the 
cohabiters, i.e., the precursors of the change.  
Although more than half of the 2012 sample reported having a relatively gender-
egalitarian distribution of chores, the reported conflicts in this regard were also a constant in their 
narratives. Daniel was a 2012 respondent who performed egalitarian behaviors with a passive 
attitude, which indicated that his partner managed the logistics and decisions of the household. 
He was 35, and she was 34, and they were the parents of a two-year-old daughter. He knew that 
to have a second child, he would need to be more involved in the housework and childcare. 
Well, the truth is that it [the housework distribution] is a little unbalanced… She handles the 
cooking and meals, and I do more cleaning. And with respect to our daughter ... we started a 
dynamic, and now it is complicated to change. And this is the kind of thing that we discuss, 
and it generates a conflict in order to have a second child… …we will have to be much more 
involved to better distribute the tasks [for two kids]. 
Despite being thirty years apart, the narratives of these two generations corroborate that the 
gender transition has advanced, but it is unfinished. These results support the extensive literature 
that in recent years has focused on the central role of gender equity in the recovery of fertility in 
very low fertility countries such as Spain (Esping-Andersen & Billari, 2015; Goldscheider et al., 
2015; McDonald, 2000a, 2000b). 
Discussion 
This paper compares the reasoning on fertility decisions in two generations approximately thirty 
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years apart. It is the result of the thrilling opportunity to analyze two independent qualitative 
studies conducted in 1985 and 2012 in Spain on urban, native-born, highly educated young 
adults. The paper analyzes whether there is a generational change on the reasoning related to 
fertility decision-making and whether or not theoretical perspectives are represented in 
individuals’ reasoning over time. Therefore, as lenses related to the SDT, economic uncertainty 
and the gender equity perspective were applied to evaluate the steadiness of fertility reasoning 
across two generations, both assessed during young adulthood.  
Is the current young adult reasoning on family formation similar to the reasoning of 
young adults’ thirty years earlier? To what extent can the theoretical arguments be identified in 
the individual reasoning? The results show that the postulates of the SDT are, to a substantial 
extent, present in the reasoning that drove family formation decisions in the 1980s. As 
Lesthaeghe indicated in 1995, “the reversibility of these changes seems highly improbable” 
(Lesthaeghe, 1995:58). However, many of the fertility constraints in the past are no longer 
present in the reasoning of the younger generation. The reason behind this variation are the 
changes in the age norms for childbearing and the partnership formation norms. These changes 
have allowed that although some of the reasoning related to individualism and postmodern 
values still prevails (i.e. developing careers, enjoying childlessness), it does not exert the same 
social and normative pressure on young adults at the same ages as in the past. The first 
hypothesis that expects that the presence of the SDT’s associated values in the fertility reasoning 
of the younger generation will be weaker than in the older generation is confirmed. 
Furthermore, the results show how, despite the passage of time, other factors related to 
economic uncertainty and the institutional context remain as obstacles to fertility. The 
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interviewees from both studies indicated how persistent economic uncertainty remains an 
invariable influence on the timing of fertility and ultimately, the intended number of desired 
children. As a consequence, the second hypothesis based on how the narratives from both sets of 
interviewees would refer to economic uncertainty as a reason for limiting or postponing their 
fertility intentions is also confirmed. 
However, the transition in gender-role norms, which is closely linked to the value change 
of the SDT, exhibited a different pace. An important part of young adults’ reasoning on their 
fertility intentions in the 2012 study is linked to the gender-role conflict derived from the 
unfinished transition of gender-role norms. Only the respondents in the 1985 study who held 
more gender-egalitarian values were already experiencing a similar gender-role conflict. The 
third hypothesis that expects that the respondents from the older generation will express fewer 
constraints on fertility decisions related to gender inequality than the younger generation due to 
the secondary role in the labor market for women from the eighties compared with the larger 
presence of dual-earner couples in the younger cohort is also confirmed. Accordingly, regarding 
the question of whether the fertility reasoning of young adults has changed across generations, 
the answer is affirmative, although it has not changed entirely. There is a strong and complex 
interrelationship among the value change, the economic and institutional contexts, and the 
unfinished gender-role transition in explaining fertility decisions. Public expenditure in the 
welfare system, including family policies, is not a government’s priority during periods of 
economic recession, which contributes to a persistent lack of protection in the labor market and a 
gender-unequal parental leave system. This situation contributes to a lack of labor market 
flexibility in helping parents face the work-life balance, which consequently perpetuates gender 
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inequality in the division of productive and reproductive tasks within households. The 
deregulation of the labor market and the persistent lack of work-life balance are obstructing the 
gender-role transition. As a consequence, young, highly educated adults find it difficult to adjust 
their lives to competent career prospects prior to family formation. 
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Figure 1. Total Fertility Rate and Mean Age at First Child, Spain, 1975-2015. 
 
Note: Data after 2001 refer only to Spanish citizens. 
Source: Demographic series, Spanish National Institute of Statistics (INE.) 
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Table 1. Main Characteristics of the Samples from 1985 and 2012 
    1985 study 2012 study 
N   43 53 
Sex Females 16 27 
  Males 27 26 
Birth cohorts 1944-1964 1976-1987 
Age range 
 
20-40 24-35 
Mean age   29.3 30.3 
Life stage Childless 20 28 
 
One child 13 25 
 Two children 10   
Source: Interview materials. 
  
“This is an original manuscript / preprint of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Bueno, X. (2019): 
Fertility Decisions in Transition: Young Adults’ Perceptions on Fertility Three Decades Apart in Spain. 
The History of the Family. (Online first on 8 novembre 2019), available online: 
https://doi.org/10.1080/1081602X.2019.1686049.” 
 
 
39 
 
Table 2. Changes in the Reasoning for the Fertility Decisions of the Respondents from 1985 and 
2012 
Stage of change 
 
Cohorts 1944-1964 
(interviewed in 1985) 
Cohorts 1976-1987 
(interviewed in 2012) 
Transitioned Age norms Enjoy childlessness (Already enjoyed 
childlessness) 
   Pressure from relatives (No social or family 
pressure, pressure from the 
biological clock) 
 Partnership 
formation 
norms 
Marriage as a requirement 
(religion) 
(Cohabitation equals 
marriage, secularization 
process) 
  Unexpected pregnancies at 
young ages that lead to 
marriage 
(Spread of contraceptive use 
and abortion) 
Unchanged Institutional 
context 
Economic stability Economic stability 
    Lack of work-life balance Lack of work-life balance 
In transition Gender-role 
norms 
Traditional model or female 
labor participation as a 
hobby or “help” for 
household income 
Career development of 
both partners and 
rejection of the traditional 
model 
    Women assumed more 
housework without 
negotiation 
More gender 
egalitarianism in 
housework and childcare 
 
Note: The reasons noted by the respondents from both sets of cohorts are expressed in bold. 
Source: Interview materials. 
 
 
 
